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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationships between attitudes, behaviour and influence. The major objective of 
influence operations is predominantly to exert soft power and in doing this there is an assumption that it will 
change attitudes. It is assumed that by changing attitudes favourable to the influencer that behaviours will be 
changed. However, this is a problematic assumption. Influence operations whose messages seem to contradict 
the real behaviour of the influencer tends to nullify the message; and, in fact, might reinforce the attitudes and 
behaviours of the foe and begin to alienate friends. Messages should be based on a credible reality; actions that 
prove that reality to be false might actually have a negative impact and reinforce unwanted behaviours. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent RAND text (Larson et al, 2009), the concept of Influence Operations is said to consist of such 
elements as diplomacy, strategic communications, public affairs, covert operations, information operations and 
is strongly influenced by military force, economic elements and civil affairs. In other words, it is about almost 
everything. It reflects the intertwined world we live in with influence actions initiated by strategic geopolitics 
and economics and designed to be targeted to the psychology of individuals and groups. However, as the 
modern world is wired, the effects of actions designed for a local area cannot be detached from the global arena. 
Decoded digital pictures of an aerial attack on suspected insurgents in Iraq, which was a very local action can 
become global overnight on the Internet as can its effect on the actions people affected by this vision. This paper 
will argue that actions and influence operations are intimately linked.  In fact, the raison d’être of influence 
operations is to alter behaviour; it is no good winning ‘hearts and minds’ if behaviour does not change. In this 
context, ‘influence’ is changing attitudes (that is a person’s evaluation of a psychological object) and behaviour 
(that is, the physical manifestation of that person’s physical body and its environment) so decisions are made 
that are beneficial to the influencer. 
Influence Operations are working in a complex world –so the approach needs to be systemic but this means that 
those at a strategic level need to know the operational effects of their actions on the psyche of both the enemy 
and their allies.  The reverse is also true where operational activity can suddenly have strategic implications. 
OBJECTIVES OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
The whole point of influence operations is to exert power via the use of soft techniques such as strategic 
communications, diplomacy and public relations, so minimizing the use of hard techniques such as military 
force and economic sanctions. A useful model of power in this context is one given by Lukes (2005) where 
three distinct levels of power are introduced. The first one-dimensional view is where one party can make 
another party do something they would not have otherwise done for example, when an enemy surrenders. The 
two-dimensional view of power includes the previous view but where a party creates or reinforces values and 
practices within a situation that limit the scope of options for another. Here the conflict may be overt or covert. 
The three-dimensional view of power adds the idea of shaping perceptions and cognitions so various options are 
not even thought about; conflict can be latent in these situations. It is this latter situation that influence 
operations would like to emulate. However, it could come into conflict with the mores of a democratic society. 
Interestingly, Lukes does bring in the idea of coercion into power conflicts but defines influence as the situation 
where one entity obtains another’s compliance without the use or threat of deprivation. In an ideal world, 
influence operations would use the three-dimensional idea of power with non-coercive tactics. In reality, the 
idea of using only influence to solve a conflict is not always feasible so whilst the concept of non-coercive 
conflict management is an appealing one, it is not always possible.  Those with great faith in soft techniques 
often forget the incredible effect of events and actions that drive people to do, rather than just think, something. 
Winning hearts and minds does not necessarily change behaviour and the work of an influence campaign can be 
neutralised by events such as the bombing of civilians or revelations of torture. 
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Information, influence and the missing factors 
The basic element of influence operations is information, which is an ill defined term, and therefore before any 
arguments about its use can be examined its meaning should be clarified. Information is created in an individual 
when data are interpreted by the brain in the context of the knowledge already possessed by that individual. 
Information is where data and cognition meet (Alberts et al, 1999). Hence, these three elements are quite 
distinct: data are basically external to the person, and are selected and absorbed by the brain then interpreted by 
the person’s knowledge base to produce information. Hence, information is personal and unique to the 
individual and a dynamic product of a person’s cognition.  
Simplistically, knowledge is long term and is developed by a complex combination of such factors as religion, 
socio-economic development, cognitive potential, body state, age, and the context of the situation at hand. 
Information has a dynamic, temporal element – it is not fixed. The ability to influence needs to take all these 
factors into account. The driving force of behaviour is within what has been termed in this paper ‘knowledge’ 
(that is the context in which data is interpreted) but this element is itself dynamic and dependent on situation and 
the type of stimulus and which part of the brain deals with the incoming data. Thus, propagandistic messages 
which appeal to emotion will stimulate a different reaction to those that deal with rational arguments. However, 
information is unique to the person and can change at different times with the same set of data with the same 
person. The premise behind many influence campaigns is that data (messages) can win the hearts and minds of 
the target audience although psychological operations tends to emphasise the use of messages that are 
coordinated with much more physical actions such as bombing or more friendly methods such as cooperative 
building projects to produce a desired effect (Radvanyi, 1990).  Some (for example, Arquilla, 2007) would use 
information operations and rely almost entirely in the information domain to persuade enemies and allies. This 
description tends to assume that human behaviour is directly controlled by the conscious part of cognition 
whereas elements of emotions are often derived from the limbic system and fed into the neo-cortex of the brain 
(Dozier, 2002). Hence, rational thought is often over-ridden by basic impulses when behavioural outcomes are 
observed.  The two basic psychological aspects of rational and emotional thought are supplemented by the very 
strong forces of social pressures and plain habit.  
There is another aspect to influence operations that is often forgotten: the physical outcomes of political 
decisions. Although political messages can be marketed much like commodities, the ideas generated must suit 
the environment (Helus, 2007). For instance, in a theatre of war, where family members are being killed and 
injured; it is futile to sell ideas that do not take the situation into account. Psychological warfare techniques 
might persuade an enemy that their position is hopeless but has not influenced them except in a very shallow 
and behavioural way. The distinction is important, practices such as bombardment, bribery or assassinations 
might be beneficial militarily but the long term political outcomes are more problematic. Throughout the last 
decade in Western countries, political and military decision makers have allowed images which have caused 
amazing dissonance in the population by actions that might make strategic sense but because the real reasons 
have been hidden and they obviously dent the social myths that the population has, for instance, the reasons 
given for the occupation of Iraq and the revelations about Abu Ghraib. It was quite astounding that Colin 
Powell’s speech at the United Nations convinced anyone considering the spurious evidence, although in this 
case it was aided by a massive pro-war media campaign in the US.  Donald Rumsfeld’s first reaction to the 
pictures about prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib was to ask who had released them rather than their content. These 
examples are not here to condemn any one person but to show examples of actions that had overwhelming 
negative influence because the decision makers could not understand that they totally disregarded the 
intellectual side of the audience in Powell’s case, and the emotional side in the Rumsfeld example.  It is almost 
as if they either took no notice of the influence these actions would have on public opinion and that the ‘stories’ 
told to the whole world would be accepted; the problems were that the actions and their associated explanations 
either did not make real sense or were emotionally unacceptable. Both did not realise the interconnected nature 
of the world – also the separation of a local and global message is not that easy in the contemporary, networked 
world. 
Contemporary influence operations theory asserts that changes in attitudes (and possibly beliefs) alter 
behaviour. However, research has shown that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is a challenging 
one (Erwin, 2001; O’Keefe, 2002). Attitudes are evaluations that give positive or negative feeling about people, 
object or abstract or issue. Attitudes have specific referents. One model divides attitudes into three components: 
affect (emotions), behaviour, and cognition (knowledge and beliefs). There can be discrepancies between each 
of these. However, this model avoids the question of whether attitudes determine behaviour as it makes 
behaviour a component of an attitude (Augoustinos et al, 2006). Therefore, the task of influence operations is to 
beneficially change (for the influencer) the emotions, behaviour, knowledge and beliefs of the targeted group. 
Also, attitudes can have strength; this is a measure of the consistent link between an attitude and specific 
attitude objects. Attitudes can also be activated where an action or message revives a hidden attitude. Influence 
campaigns often try to surface these as they do with unconscious attitudes (implicit attitudes). As attitudes are 
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not all conscious an influence operation needs to research underlying assumptions in the ‘target’ population. 
Evidence showing attitudes lead to behaviours is weak whereas evidence showing behaviour leads to attitudes is 
stronger. For example, allied soldiers in the conflict in Afghanistan may develop attitudes to the local populace 
entirely on their experience in the context of their role. Here these attitudes might be reinforced by their own 
hidden attitudes and stereotypes. 
INFLUENCE VERSUS BEHAVIOUR 
There are a number of stages needed to change behaviour (Cragin and Gerwehr, 2005):  
 Compliance: requires a short term effort and uses tactics such as coercion and enticement, this would 
include traditional psychological warfare tactics and such means as bribery. It is very much akin to 
using the one-dimensional view of power as the model for action; 
 Conformity: requires a medium term effort and uses tactics such as social and environmental 
manipulation. This is analogous to the two dimensional model of power, and; 
 Conversion: requires a long term effort and attempts to shape the worldview of people and limits the 
scope of their perception. 
This model was designed to explain radicalisation but it gives insight to any influence campaign. Although the 
creators of this model explain it as a series of progressive stages, it is useful just to classify different grades of 
influence. The goal of most influence campaigns is to get to the ‘conversion’ stage and this requires long term 
efforts such as this found in conventional education systems or really consistent and long term advertising 
campaigns. However, others posit that strong attitudes and beliefs (that is, those more accessible from memory) 
are more resistant to persuasion and are more likely to predict behaviour. So paradoxically, if influence is 
successful it will be more difficult to alter that attitude and behaviour patterns by future influence efforts. The 
issue is further complicated as influence is almost impossible to measure either qualitatively or quantitatively as 
it is transient and its effect on behaviour is tenuous (Geltzer and Forest, 2009).  
Even though certain coercive actions might alter behaviour there would have been no influence as defined 
above. This might be sufficient in highly combative situations but is less useful in drawn out insurgencies or 
terrorist actions which are political rather than purely military in nature. In these situations more integrated 
actions are needed. It is argued here that marketing ideas is not sufficient to get a long term behavioural change. 
The actions of the influencer will shape the outcomes not just influence campaigns; although this seems self 
evident many influence campaigns do not appear to see the link. There should be no mismatch between the ideas 
promulgated and the behaviour of the influencer. Hence, to argue that A is here to protect B and the actions of A 
results in the harm of B, it will not be effective. To win a war of ideas actions must match message. It is almost 
futile to craft an elaborate message if the actions of the messenger blatantly contradict the meaning and spirit of 
the message. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper postulates that influence operations have ambitions to be a non-coercive means to change the 
behaviours of groups. These groups are normally antagonistic toward the influencers but also might be allies 
that need to be encouraged. However, the influencing of people is a complex task that involves a myriad of 
factors and is context specific. When there is a conflict situation where worldviews clash then the difficulty in 
fundamentally influencing the target is a much more involved with the influencers behaviour rather than just 
marketing ideas and images.  
Of course, influence operations need to plan for desired behaviour patterns that are required of the targets of the 
influence campaigns and this is awkward. Ultimately, the overt goal of the influencer is to get the target to 
behave a particular way. However, often the targets are forced or encouraged to behave in a particular way not 
because they believe in that form of behaviour but it is seen as the easy way out of a predicament. 
Influence campaigns have been made much more difficult in recent years because of the mixed and 
contradictory messages that have been send out by the Allies, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the 
overt geopolitical objectives do not logically fit with the actions taken. For example, Friedman (2010) states that 
the overall American strategy is to not allow any state or groups of states to counter American economic and 
military power, and to win outright in Iraq or Afghanistan is not the purpose. Of course, this argument makes 
the actions in Serbia, Iraq, and Afghanistan quite rational; however, it does not assist those trying to influence 
allied, neutral and enemy populations that the actions taken are for the overt, expressed reasons. This is quite 
challenge for those involved in influence campaigns as the geopolitical realities bear no resemblance to 
propaganda arguments or actions. In fact, if Friedman’s argument is taken to its logical conclusion that is 
exactly the desired effect: that of total confusion where both friend and foe are bewildered, except of course, 
those planning the actions. In the last decade, Western geopolitical strategies are necessarily secret but make the 
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task of persuading domestic audiences that the message is a true reflection of reality. Hence, influencing both 
friendly and antagonistic audiences is made extremely difficult. In fact, it gives sustenance to the foes of the 
West by ridiculing the messages put out. If there is a mismatch between action and the espoused worldview, it 
would seem that an influence campaign would be less than successful.  
For instance, there is often a disconnect in the messages from the Western allies in the conflict in Afghanistan. 
Whilst there is a geopolitical reason for troops to be in Afghanistan, these messages are often lost on the 
domestic population where abstract concepts such as ‘freedom’ had must less impact than the more concrete 
arguments (Newcourt-Nowodworski, 2005). A report such as the following from the BBC on 22nd February, 
2010 would cause an immense amount of dissonance: 
 
“Air strike kills Afghan civilians 
At least 27 civilians died in a NATO air strike in southern Afghanistan, the Afghan cabinet says, revising 
downwards a prior statement that 33 were killed. 
NATO said it hit a suspected insurgent convoy, but ground forces later found "a number of individuals killed 
and wounded", including women and children. 
Sunday's attack, in Uruzgan province, was not part of a major NATO-led push in neighbouring Helmand 
province. 
Civilian deaths in strikes have caused widespread resentment in Afghanistan.” 
         [BBC, 2010] 
The physical outcomes of the abstract goal of freedom are superseded in many peoples’ minds. Hence, many in 
the West would be appalled at the deaths of children as they have been bombarded with propaganda since the 
Second World War setting up the social myth of a compassionate society whose military forces do not kill in 
this manner. Hence, this revulsion is not taken away by a rational apology stating that it was a mistake 
especially when the Western forces have been stating since the First Gulf War in 1991 that they had superior 
technology and intelligence systems that could give pin-point accuracy. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a need in the West to research strategies that will create favourable attitudes and behaviours in both 
foreign and domestic audiences. However, in a pluralist society this is problematic as beliefs and attitudes are 
varied and one focus in a campaign may be taken differently by various groups in that community. It is much 
easier in a society that has constant beliefs and attitudes; however, this is rare in a globalized and multi-culture 
environment. An ideal information space to investigate this is the Internet especially as Web2 has produced 
many interactive social network applications. Unlike the one way nature of Web1, this allows virtual 
communities to develop. Whether these can replicate physical groups is debatable, however, some insight could 
be gained by researching influence campaigns in this environment over a number of virtual groupings. 
Finally, it could be as simple as going back to a dictum: “good politics requires good propaganda, and good 
propaganda requires good propaganda”. 
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